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ABSTRACT
Distributed renewable energy systems (DRESs) and their inter-
connection network, typically using Internet-based protocols, are
susceptible to a wide range of cyber-security and resilience chal-
lenges. These challenges have been shown to cause problems for
the overall grid optimization process. In order to detect such events,
we argue that an adequate correlation between network and energy
generation data is required. Therefore, in this study, we provide a
work-in-progress insight related to the profiling of real network
data and energy generation measurements gathered by a local wind-
turbine at Lancaster University. We argue that such an analysis
is very important to profile various attack vectors in the modern
energy networks that consider DRESs and take necessary actions
to prevent any data breaches in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
The continuous and incremental consumer-side energy demand
has unavoidably escalated the burden on power grids on a global
scale [1]. The integration of distributed renewable energy sources
(DRESs) is considered as a promising solution towards aiding the
core grid during peak demand periods by supplying considerably
"green" energy with limited costs in comparison with traditional
sources of energy (e.g., fossil fuels). According to the Energy Infor-
mation Administration, DRESs constitute 12.5% of the total energy
generation of the world and their use is further anticipated to rise
to 20% by the year 2040 to produce about 130 quadrillion Btu per
year [1]. However, this large DRESs network is prone to attacks
such as cyber-attacks that can, in the worst case scenario, lead to
grid breakdown or even blackouts [2]. This is because DRESs, apart
from fulfilling the partial energy needs of the consumers, also par-
take in providing ancillary services such as frequency regulation
for maintaining grid stability. Any deviation from their normal
working can lead to disruption in the grid that can ultimately cause
grid breakdown. Therefore, it is important to detect and prevent
any attempted unauthorized access to deployed DRES systems.
While most communication, in DRESs, is and will be protected
through the use of secure protocols, this by itself is not enough. The
use of, and dependency on, ancillary services and protocols allows
more opportunity for attacks. We argue that explicitly within DRES
systems, a particular point of interest is the analysis of identified
correlations between network traffic and energy generation, either
in terms ofmanagement/ operational data or updates to controls/ set
points. Working in this direction, in this work-in-progress paper, we
conduct a measurement-based approach and analyze the network
flow and generation data within a real DRES end-system (the local
wind turbine) to identify potential security loopholes.
2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
An overview of the schematics and the main network connections
of the wind turbine installed at Lancaster University are shown
in Fig. 1. The installed capacity of this wind turbine is 2.3 MW,
working on a 11kV electrical line. Fig. 1 illustrates that the tur-
bine communicates with an external server in charge of storing its
generation data. Moreover, this external server is responsible for
managing system configurations, micro-controller settings, data
security assurance, and any associated software or network-related
issues that relate to the wind turbine. Data is collected for the real
Figure 1: System overview - Schematics & connections.
wind turbine energy generation unit along with the associated net-
work data flows between the wind turbine and the server. The wind
turbine generation data is gathered for every minute and consists of
30 different attributes. The network-related data is monitored using
NetFlow, with records generated whenever any IP address attempts
to communicate with the turbine using its IP interface. IP addresses
in the network data have been further post-analyzed using geolo-
cation data and the dataset is extended to comprehensively profile
both legitimate and any potentially malicious network flows.
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to perform the statistical analysis, one day’s data (1st Janu-
ary 2019) is analyzed with respect to the energy generation from the
wind turbine as well as the network flow data. Our initial findings
suggest that the corresponding network information to/from the
data server does not necessarily depend on the energy generation
of the wind turbine. We identify that the wind-turbine updates the
server periodically by sending all of the previous hour’s data in
one burst (after being ESP encapsulated, [3]), while the residual
continuous packet flow (over TCP/UDP) results from active moni-
toring of various sensors installed on the wind turbine. Moreover,
the average packet size does not vary significantly from its pattern,
thus it is implied that the underlying network communication is
not synchronized with the actual energy generation.
We also provide an insight related to malicious scans aiming
to identify security loopholes on the wind turbine. The profile of
malicious intent scanning (or unauthorized data access requests)










































































































Figure 2: (a) Count of malicious IP addresses per country; (b)
Mean packet size per malicious scan flow.
provided by BadPackets LLC (BadPackets LLC: https://badpackets.
net/), a correlation analysis between the various access requests to
the wind-turbine is performed. Based on the correlation analysis,
we identify 327 distinct IP addresses originating from Autonomous
Systems (ASes) distributed in 8 different countries. All IP addresses
were flagged asmembers ofMirai-alike botnets and they all initiated
scans with malicious intent in order to penetrate the wind-turbine
within a single day. Table 1 highlights the top 8 ASes from which
most of the identified malicious scans were received.
Table 1: Top 8 ASes targeting local wind-turbine
Organisation IP count Country
SuperNetwork s.r.o. 148 Czechia
CariNet, Inc. 49 USA
HLL LLC 29 Russia
CHINA UNICOM Backbone 18 China
LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. 16 Netherlands
QuadraNet, Inc 15 USA
Jisc Services Limited 14 UK
Merit Network Inc. 12 USA
Further analysis of the identified unauthorized IP addresses
shows that they send requests within a very short duration and
send few data packets as evident from Figs. 3(a) and 3(c). This is due
to the fact that these IP addresses are corresponding to potentially
malicious/bot devices that aim to establish a connection in order to
further infiltrate the wind turbine.
This analysis reveals the contrasting nature of unauthorized
IPs and the legitimate IPs as it can be seen in Figs. 3(b) and 3(d)
that a longer-lived connection is established when monitoring the
sensors, while major packet flow is happening in short bursts of
time. Consequently, our analysis leads to an interesting correlation
that both the malicious attempts and major data flows happen
for a shorter time duration. Thus, we can utilise this observation
to profile attack signatures such as to block the wind turbine on
transmitting data to unauthorized IP addresses.
The Pearson correlation output of the malicious access attempts
revealed that unauthorized requests are more random in nature as
compared to legitimate requests where the correlation between IP
source port and IP destination port is high, by more than 40%. It is
to be noted that unauthorized access requests happen mostly via
the TCP/UDP protocols, however, a few of the unauthorized IPs
tried to access the wind turbine using the ICMP protocol, where the
targeted attack was much more focused. The ICMP-based access
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: (a) Duration for unauthorized requests; (b) Dura-
tion for authorized requests; (c) Packets sent for unautho-
rized requests; (d) Packets flow for authorized requests.
control requests are anticipated to be a potential “ping of death"
attack where the attacker sent crafted ICMP packets greater than
1500 bytes as being the threshold for the acceptable Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) size over Ethernet-based networks.
4 CONCLUSION
This work-in-progress paper provides a first insight on the network
and data generation-wise analysis of a wind-turbine installedwithin
the Lancaster University campus. Through an inter-correlation
analysis, we identify the patterns in which thewind-turbine updates
a remote server hosted by the managing third-party company. From
a pure network-based analysis, we observe the number of scans
with malicious intent by Mirai-infected bots aiming to penetrate
the wind-turbine and obtain useful information. In addition, we
observe a "ping of death" performed by one of the scanners in which
large sized ICMP packets were sent to various ports on the turbine.
We argue that this piece of work can act as a useful input on the
systematic cyber-security assessment of DRES end-systems.
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